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K A T Z  C O N T E S T  W I N N E R
New England Classical Journal 44.2 (2017) 98-113




In Bellum Gallicum Caesar introduces his readers to unfamiliar places and peoples 
in the course of his conquests in Britain, Germany, and Gaul. While most of the 
text is devoted to people, events, and problems within Gaul, the questions of who 
is a Gaul and what is Gaul endure throughout the text. In Bellum Gallicum, Gauls 
are often defined externally, through their relationship to other peoples and places, 
rather than internally, according to their own traits or characteristics. A similar situ-
ation exists for the idea of Gaul as a place. Gallic characters are portrayed as inferior 
to Romans and Germans throughout the text, and Gaul as a country is constantly 
under the threat of foreign domination. Throughout Bellum Gallicum, Caesar creates 
and explains a Gallic identity which is constructed similarly to a modern Orientalist 
identity. This paper will first explain the idea of Borealism, which is a useful way of 
thinking about the portrayal of northern barbarians in Caesar’s thought, and then 
will move on to examine the relationship between Gauls and Germans, the portray-
als of Gauls independent from comparison with other peoples, and the relationship 
between Gauls and Romans. In doing so it will explain how and why Caesar con-
structs the identity that he does for the Gauls.
Before we can explain how Caesar defines Gallic identity, it will be useful to 
have a framework for discussing foreign construction of identity. Edward Said sets 
up such a framework, Orientalism, which he explains as “a way of coming to terms 
with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western 
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experience.”1 While Said is focused on the Arab world, Persia, and India in relation 
to European colonialism, the system he describes seems applicable to non-Roman 
peoples north of the Republic in the 1st century BCE.2 Said explains that “The 
Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture.”3 This is 
certainly true of the role of Britain, Gaul, and Germany in Caesar’s day, as evidenced 
by the fact that Caesar mentions trade with the Gauls (and to a lesser extent Brit-
ain and Germany) in Bellum Gallicum 1.1 and throughout the text. Said continues: 
“Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as 
a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, 
doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”4 Here, too, there are par-
allels with Roman Gaul, which certainly has its own colonial bureaucracy and styles, 
and for which Caesar presents scholarship, ideology, and vocabulary (such as in the 
ethnography in book 6). As Krebs points out, Roman knowledge of “the North” is 
tinged with political facts every bit as much as Western knowledge of “the Orient” 
is today,5 and so we arrive at Borealism. Borealism is the framework for Roman do-
minion of “the North” in Roman thought, parallel to Orientalism as the framework 
for Western dominion of the Orient in modern Western thought.6 While Krebs 
applies Said’s ideas to Germans in Roman thought, the Gauls receive a related treat-
ment from Caesar. Since the Gauls cannot describe themselves in Roman literature, 
they must be silent or they must be spoken for, and when Caesar speaks for them, 
his remarks occur within the framework of Borealism. Due to the political reali-
ties of Roman involvement in Gaul, Britain, and Germany during Bellum Gallicum, 
Caesar’s writing has to navigate both the realities he experienced and the ideological 
justification for Roman expansion. Caesar’s Borealist thought about the Gauls and 
Gaul is a way to synthesize these two factors in Bellum Gallicum.
The next question at hand is “What is Gaul?” Caesar’s explanation of the place 
where Bellum Gallicum takes place is confusing in light of the events which happen 
there. The text begins with a brief description of Gaul. Notably, only one of the 
1  Said (1994, p. 1).
2  Krebs (2010, p. 202).
3  Said (1994, p. 2).
4  Said (1994, p. 2).
5  Krebs (2010, p. 202).
6  There is also Orientalism in Roman thought, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. For a simple 
example, though, consider how Vergil portrays the eastern armies of Anthony in the Battle of Actium on the 
shield of Aeneas at the end of Aeneid 8.
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three parts of Gaul is actually inhabited by Gauls (Celtae). It is unclear why exactly 
the Belgae and the Aquitani are lumped in with the Gauls, other than that it is 
convenient for Caesar.7 Because Caesar uses the term Gaul inclusively, he makes 
his later campagins agains the Aquitani and Belgae seem more natural, since they 
are just more Gauls to deal with, rather than a whole new challenge like Germany 
or Britain. They are explicitly not part of the group the Romans have traditionally 
called Gauls.8 Aside from that, the supposed boundaries of what Caesar calls Gaul 
are porous when Bellum Gallicum begins. The Rhine is a natural barrier, to be sure, 
but one that people regularly cross. We hear about the Menapii in 4.4, for instance: 
Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant. There are also Gauls 
living in Germany (6.24) and Germans living in Gaul (1.31), as we learn throughout 
the text. Moreover, the culture of the Gauls (the people who call themselves Celtae) 
seems closely linked to Britain, where their Druids go for education (6.13). Even the 
British Channel is therefore an open border. All of this is evidence that “Gaul” is 
loosely defined at best, and that the boundaries of Gaul are nebulous when Caesar 
arrives.
During the course of Bellum Gallicum, the definition of Gaul shifts as well. 
Trans Rhenum as a phrase appears 15 times in the text, but only 4 of them are in the 
first three books. In other words, the Rhine becomes a much more important prob-
lem for Caesar as he remains longer in Gaul, and he makes it into a firmer boundary 
than it is initially. When Caesar arrives in Gaul, thousands of Germans live west of 
the Rhine and thousands of Gauls live east of the Rhine. By expelling Ariovistus 
and pushing out subsequent German incursions in books 4 and 6, Caesar makes 
the Rhine a closed border rather than an open one. Similarly, his expeditions to 
Britain punish the British for their involvement in Gaul, which seems to have gone 
on since time immemorial. These expeditions make the Channel a firm boundary 
for Gaul. Caesar, to a large extent, invents Gaul by defining it is as the space he can 
hold onto.9 If Caesar had conquered territory across the Rhine or in Britain, then he 
would likely have defined Gaul more broadly. If the Aquitani or Belgae had resisted 
Roman rule, then Gaul might well be smaller than it is in Bellum Gallicum.
7  Schadee (2008, p. 160).
8  This is clear from Bellum Gallicum itself, since in 1.1.1 Caesar explicitly says that the Belgae and Aquitani 
are not Galli (Celtae). Galli must refer, at least originally, to the Celtae in order for this statement to make 
sense, even if Caesar uses it more broadly. Krebs (2010, p. 204).
9  Krebs (2010, pp. 204-205) and Schadee (2008, p. 159).
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We can see, therefore, that if Gaul is where the Gauls live, and if Caesar is the driv-
ing force behind firm boundaries for Gaul, then Gallic identity is also defined by 
Caesar. Of course, there were Gauls (the Celtae from BG 1.1) long before Caesar was 
born, but the definition seems to have been different before he arrived in the area. 
The sack of Rome in 390 by the Gauls was an enduring image in the Roman mind 
in Caesar’s day (Livy 5.39-48 was written just one generation after Bellum Gallicum). 
Even Caesar mentions past troubles in Gaul, such as the humiliation of a Roman 
army and death of Lucius Cassius at the hands of the Helvetii (1.7), which happened 
a few years before Caesar was born. Gauls, therefore, play an important role in Ro-
man history long before Caesar. Caesar’s unique position is to explore, explain, and 
subjugate what was once a strange land in the distant north. The Gauls he presents 
in Bellum Gallicum are consistent with earlier notions of Gaul, but presented in a 
way that is also in keeping with Caesar’s ideological goals (to justify his conquests). 
In other words, all definition of Gauls in Bellum Gallicum is really external defini-
tion, even if it is presented as Gallic definition of Gaul, because it must conform 
with Caesar’s goals for the text.10 In addition, Caesar is able to redefine the old-fash-
ioned view of Gaul and Gauls in Bellum Gallicum because he brings new informa-
tion about Gaul back to Rome.11 His explorations and familiarity with the territories 
and peoples give him the credibility to change the Roman view of Gaul and Gauls.
This redefinition is revealed by Caesar’s portrayal of Gallic attacks on Romans 
in the text. The Helvetii, for instance, are an old Roman enemy who rise up once 
more to threaten the province. Caesar defeats them and puts them back in their 
place. But in doing so he reveals the weakness of the Gallic chiefs, as seen at 1.30 
and 1.31. Although the threat of a Gallic invasion is a familiar theme in Roman 
history, Caesar has used it for new ideological ends. That is to say, he is using the 
threat of the Helvetii to avoid questions about his adventures in Gaul to the Roman 
people and the Gauls themselves. This is a strategy to smooth over the fact that he 
is conquering huge swathes of territory of his own accord. He continues this theme 
throughout the text. Throughout his time as proconsul in Gaul he takes advantage 
of conflicts among Gauls, Britons, and Germans to extend his own power further 
north. In doing so, Caesar justifies his expansion to the Romans and makes it more 
palatable to his Gallic allies, like the Aedui.
10  Schadee remarks that Caesar wants to “[parcel] out Europe in sections more or less suitable to eventual 
incorporation into the Roman empire” (2008, p. 159). I agree with her that this is one of Caesar’s goals for the 
text. He is breaking Gaul, Britain, and Germany apart so that they appear like manageable additions to the 
empire.
11  Schadee (2008, p. 159).
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Let us consider Vercingetorix and the Borealist characterization Caesar gives us of 
him as an example of Caesar’s careful construction of a useful Gallic character. In 
7.4 we learn that Vercingetorix is the best Gaul of all time. Caesar heaps superlatives 
onto him, such as summa potentia and summae diligentiae summam imperi servitatem 
addit, which are otherwise rare in BG. 4.2% of instances of summa in the text are in 
7.4 referring to Vercingetorix (a vast overrepresentation, given that this is half a page 
out of about two hundred twenty-five pages of text). This is the best Gaul Caesar 
faces in the text, and the biggest threat to Roman domination of Gaul. In some 
respects, such as his cruelty (7.4.10), Vercingetorix represents the worst of northern 
barbarism in the Roman mind. Compare Brennus, the Gallic chief who sacks Rome 
in Livy, and his cruelty in burning the city and mistreating the surrendering Romans 
(Livy, 5.48). Vercingetorix, the noble, brave, cruel barbarian hero, fits into the Bore-
alist narrative perfectly. He is a way of coming to terms with the north as it relates 
to Rome. The figure of a worthy foe explains the setbacks Rome faces by creating 
an enemy that Romans are able to lose to with dignity. The Borealist framework 
through which Romans view Gauls allows them to accept the possibility of defeat at 
the hands of a savage Gaul, especially since the Gauls burned Rome in the distant 
past. It is a way to rationalize defeat by a seemingly inferior people. But Caesar, of 
course, manages to defeat Vercingetorix. He creates a stock character, a noble savage, 
and elevates himself through defeating him. Bellum Gallicum shows us how Caesar 
and his Roman readers could engage with Gauls through Vercingetorix, not how 
Gauls would interact with him. The information in the text about how Gauls felt 
about Vercingetorix and his uprising are only available through the Caesarian lens. 
Even remarks about the willingness of Gauls to follow Vercingetorix only allow Ro-
mans to rationalize the uprising, and do not represent actual Gallic viewpoints. He 
is therefore an element of external definition of Gaul, despite being a strong Gallic 
character in the text. Despite the apparent positive traits of Vercingetorix, he is a 
tool for Caesar’s domination of Gaul.
A word about geographical determinism is also in order before we proceed. 
Geographical determinism is, broadly speaking, the idea that a people’s physical 
environment determines their character. For instance, Thomas Jefferson believed 
that Africans were lazy and uncivilized by nature due to the warm climate of West 
Africa.12 Geographical determinism is found in antiquity in Hippocrates, among 
other writers. The tropes he uses to describe the tribes of Europe are similar to the 
descriptions given by Caesar.
12  Gates (2011, pp. 17-24).
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ὁκόσοι μὲν χώρην ὀρεινήν τε οἰκέουσι καὶ τρηχεῖαν καὶ ὑψηλὴν 
καὶ ἔνυδρον, καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ αὐτοῖσι γίνονται τῶν ὡρέων μέγα 
διάφοροι, ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἴδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον 
καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα, καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἱ 
τοιαῦται φύσιες οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν.
    (Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places 24)
The Helvetii, who come from a land which is τραχύς and ὑψηλός (the Alps) and 
ἔνυδρος (Lake Geneva and the Rhone), fit the stereotype that Hippocrates gives 
for certain types of European peoples. Caesar’s portrayal of them, such as the gloria 
belli atque fortitudinis that he mentions (BG 1.2.6) is consistent with the stereotype 
found in Airs, Waters, Places. This kind of determinist thinking is common in Bellum 
Gallicum. For instance, Caesar implies that the harsher living conditions in Germa-
ny make the Germans a hardier people when he describes their meagre clothes and 
habit of bathing in rivers in 6.21. As a further example, in 6.24 we learn that the Vol-
gae Tectosages are Gauls who have retained their ancient hardiness by moving into 
Germany, while other Gauls have grown soft. An outstanding question is whether 
it is proximity to Rome or the land of Gaul itself that makes the Gauls softer than 
the Germans, and I will say more on this later.13 For now it is enough to note that 
the strange creatures (6.25-27) and harsh climate of Germany are seen to make the 
Germans a strong people.14 By comparison, the Gauls are consistently portrayed as 
soft and weak due in part to their environment (1.1.3, 6.24). Just as Jefferson used his 
views on the “natural” character of Africans due to their climate to justify slavery, 
Caesar is able to use the “natural” weakness of the Gauls, which he attributes to their 
fertile, forgiving environment, to justify bringing Gaul under Roman rule. 
The idea of strong Germans and weak Gauls leads nicely to the comparison 
of Gauls and Germans in the text. One of the primary ways that Caesar creates an 
identity for Gaul and Gauls is to compare them with their German neighbors. It 
is unclear what exactly defines “Gaul” as a place at the start of the Bellum Gallicum, 
since it is divided into three parts and inhabited by hundreds of tribes with their 
own ways and customs. One of the only common factors of all of the “Gauls” then is 
13  The text provides statements that support both ideas. At 1.1.3 Caesar comments on the “feminizing” 
influence of Roman trade, but in 6.24 we learn that living in harsh conditions has proected the Volgae Tec-
tosages from the degeneration other Gauls have experienced.
14  Allen-Hornblower (2015, p. 683).
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that they are not Germans.15 Indeed, a major thread throughout the Bellum Gallicum 
is the conflict between Gauls and Germans. Ariovistus in book 1 is one iteration of 
years of conflict as Germans cross the Rhine to take advantage of instability and 
weakness in Gaul. Ariovistus’s presence west of the Rhine gives Caesar an oppor-
tunity to define Gallic character in book 1, when the Gallic chiefs beg him for help.
Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et 
cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos 
plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad C et XX milium numerum.    
       (BG 1.31.4)
This tells us a few things about the Gauls: (i) they see the Germans as feri, (ii) Gaul 
is more fertile and desirable than Germany, and (iii) the Gauls cannot prevent the 
Germans from crossing the Rhine. The first and second points reinforce the idea 
of geographical determinism as a reason for Gallic weakness. The Germans covet 
Gaul because it is good, fertile land (and one whose inhabitants cannot defend it), 
and the people who live west of the Rhine see the Germans as ferocious barbarians 
because they come from a less forgiving country. The savagery that is causing the 
Gauls so much trouble is linked to the nature of the two countries on either side 
of the Rhine. It does not really matter that the eastern banks of the Rhine are no 
less fertile than the western ones, only that Caesar sees it in this way because the 
far side is uncultivated. The effect of this lack of cultivation is to make the Germans 
seem more frightening and foreign to readers. That said, the soft Gauls are unable to 
protect themselves from the ferocious Germans, which more or less sets the scene 
for future Germano-Gallic conflicts in this text.
Due to this ongoing inability of the Gauls to keep the Germans across the 
Rhine, during the course of Caesar’s involvement in Gaul the Gauls become more 
and more dependent on Roman help to keep the Germans out. Two things deserve 
notice here. One is that the best of the Gauls are those who fight the Germans the 
most often. The Belgae (1.1) and the Helvetii (1.2) are both better warriors than the 
rest of the Gauls, and bigger problems for Caesar. The Gauls who do not need Cae-
sar’s help to avoid German domination are praised in the text as the best of their 
countrymen. But, for the most part, Caesar is called in to help the Gauls when the 
Germans invade. In 1.31, the Gallic chiefs beg Caesar to deliver them from the Ger-
15  Despite German heritage, plerosque Belgas esse ortos a Germanis (2.4) does not lead Caesar to lump the 
Belgae in with the Germans, and their lands are explicitly said to be part of Gaul in 1.1.
— 105 —
mans, flentes (1.31.2), because the German chief Ariovistus has defeated the Aedui 
and Sequani, the two strongest Gallic tribes. Caesar defeats Ariovistus (revealing 
that Caesar’s army is more powerful than the strongest Gallic tribes are) and “saves” 
Gaul from the Germans. Perhaps at this point the Gauls do not realize that by in-
viting Caesar to remove the Germans, they are setting themselves up to call on Ger-
man aid to remove the Romans later on. When Caesar repels the German invasion 
in book 4 and crosses the Rhine, we see the Gallic reliance on Rome again. Without 
Caesar the Germans would have moved freely into Gaul and taken much of the 
country from the Gauls, but the Romans’ act of keeping the Germans out makes 
the Gauls more dependent on Rome for support. In 5.55 Indutiomarus tries to bring 
Germans across the Rhine to fight the Romans, but they refuse to cross due to their 
recent defeats at Caesar’s hands. Eventually in 6.2 the Treviri succeed in bringing 
Germans into Gaul to help them fight Caesar, but the only Germans who will come 
are those who have not fought Caesar before. Throughout Bellum Gallicum, Gaul is 
caught in a tug of war between the Germans and Caesar. The Gauls, as Caesar tells 
it, can do little more than align themselves with one or the other.
With that in mind, let us turn to the relationship between Gauls and Romans 
in the text. Caesar tells us that Roman trade has a feminizing influence on the Gauls. 
The Belgae are introduced in 1.1 in part as people ea quae ad effeminandos animos per-
tinent important (BG 1.1.3). In other words, the goods the Romans sell to the Gauls 
are a feminizing influence from Caesar’s point of view. But the Romans and their 
trade also bring cultus atque humanitas (1.1.3) to the Gauls. These two ideas seem to 
be in tension, since presumably Caesar considers feminizing influence a bad thing 
and cultus et humanitas good things. In practice, it seems that feminization and cul-
ture both have the same outcome for the Gauls, namely to make them weaker than 
the Romans and Germans. Caesar makes several comparisons, explicit and implicit, 
between Gauls and Romans which explain why the Romans can have wine and 
cloth and such without becoming weak, while the Gauls are undermined by them.16
Caesar holds a low opinion of the Gallic national character. BG 7.42.2 is a good 
example of this: Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi 
hominum generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta. The Gauls 
are vulnerable to avaritia, iracundia, and temeritas, all of which are sins of their race 
rather than of any one Gaul, according to Caesar. Perhaps individual Romans suffer 
16  Of course, some Romans were unhappy with the proliferation of luxury goods in Rome, and luxuria is 
one of the bywords of Livy and Vergil a generation later as antithetical to Romanitas. For discussion of which, 
see Feldherr (1998, pp. 155-156) and Syed (2007, pp. 184-187).
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from these things, but they are not sins of the Romans as a nation. Since this is a 
condemnation of all Gauls, it taints each Gaul we meet in the text. Moreover, in 4.5, 
Caesar is worried because of the infirmitas Gallorum (he repeats the idea in 4.13 and 
7.26 with infirmitas again). At 3.8, he remarks ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina 
consilia. In 3.19, he makes a stronger condemnation of the Gauls: Nam ut ad bella 
suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad ca-
lamitates ferendas mens eorum est. From remarks like these throughout the text Cae-
sar constructs a picture of a Gallic people who are flighty and unreliable. He is not 
the only author to do so. Strabo (4.4.2, 4) and Diodorus Siculus (5.26, 28, 29) make 
similar remarks.17 The natural point of comparison is the well disciplined and more 
restrained Romans, who are presumably more able to handle defeat, if the Gallic 
conduct in 3.19 merits such a response. Indeed, this superior virtus is an important 
component of Roman success over the Aquitani in book 3.18 Superior virtus and oth-
er traits allow the Romans to be superior to other Gauls throughout the text as well.
This characterization of the Gauls is unfair because (i) it generalizes all the 
Gauls and (ii) it is proven untrue by Caesar’s narrative in Bellum Gallicum. During 
the course of this text, Caesar fights Gauls (Celtae), Aquitani, and Belgae, who all 
live in what he calls Gaul. There is no one group of Gauls that he can paint with as 
broad a brush as he uses in the remarks above. He is making generalizations about 
broad groups of people based on unrepresentative sections of the population of one 
of those groups at any given time. As Said might put it, these generalizations about 
so-called Gallic character (as opposed to Roman character) are a way of coming to 
terms with an unfamiliar place and people. They are part of the Borealist narrative 
Caesar is building in Bellum Gallicum. But even beyond that, these generalizations 
are untrue. Caesar’s own narrative shows that the Gauls are cunning and tenacious 
in the face of the Roman foe. The plot of Bellum Gallicum is basically that every year 
Caesar is in Gaul, some group of Gauls resists Roman expansion into Gaul. This 
willingness to fight for their homes against greater and greater odds hardly seems to 
demonstrate infirmitas Gallorum. Nor is every Gallic plan foolish and adopted too 
hastily. The plan Ambiorix explains in 5.27 is hardly ill advised or adopted without 
thought. The best hope of the Gauls to free their homelands (de recuperanda communi 
libertate 5.27.6) probably was to strike while the Romans were divided, Caesar was 
17  Gardner (1983, pp. 185-186).
18  Erickson (2002, p. 601) points out that the Veneti are never said to show virtus in the text, whereas oth-
er Gauls are, presumably because they lack this trait. Instead they rely on skill and knowledge to fight Caesar. 
Some other Gauls have virtus, but lack any other traits to do battle with the Romans.
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away, and the soldiers were reliant on Gauls for supplies, which is precisely what 
they are in book 5. Caesar tells the reader that the national character of the Gauls is 
poor and so they are weak, but this generalization is so broad that it has little mean-
ing, and the text does not uphold his judgement. 
The British used a similar line of justification for their occupation of Egypt 
in the 19th century, claiming that local rule was much worse off than British rule 
because people who live in the East are less suited to rule than those in the West. 
Said quotes Arthur James Balfour (a prominent MP at the turn of the 20th century) 
on the subject of Egypt:
Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings 
of those capacities for self-government … having merits of their own …
You may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called, 
broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self-government.19
This is not so dissimilar from the idea of Gauls as flighty, untrustworthy, and inca-
pable of self defence. We can see that the attitudes that made Orientalism a useful 
ideology for British imperialism in Egypt are similar to the attitude Caesar takes 
towards the Gauls to justify Roman intervention in Gaul. That is to say that the 
idea of a people incapable of self governance and in need of domination by a nation 
better suited to rulership is as useful to Caesar as it is to Balfour. Said goes on to 
summarize Balfour’s logic:
England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows 
that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by 
occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied 
and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of 
contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, 
British occupation.20
Caesar is not as far down this road as Balfour (or Said’s Balfour, at any rate), but 
Bellum Gallicum reveals similar logic. Caesar knows Gaul, as he demonstrates with 
his ethnography and geography. Gaul is what Caesar knows, as is revealed by his 
redefinition of Gaul throughout the text. Gaul cannot have self-government, which 
19  Said (1994, p. 40).
20  Said (1994, p. 42).
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is confirmed by Gallic inability to resist the Germans. Caesar confirms the Gallic 
inability to govern themselves by occupying Gaul. Caesar did not live long enough 
to see the process completed, but Bellum Gallicum shows steps down the same road.
Let us consider another of Said’s remarks on the relationship between the Ori-
ent and Occident. “Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and 
even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, 
scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”21 We 
see this phenomenon in Gaul in the form of the title amicus populi Romani (such as 
at 1.3.3). The nature of amiticia in the late Roman Republic is murky. It seems to have 
been a way to convey limited judicial and legal privileges to those who performed 
some service to the Roman people.22 It is a legal relationship between non-Roman 
people and the Roman state. This is a supporting institution to the Romans’ Bore-
alist interaction with the Gauls. It is a way for the Romans to ask something of and 
reward natives who prove useful to their ambitions in the province, and later beyond. 
Even Ariovistus was an amicus populi Romani (1.35), so the phenomenon extends far 
beyond the limits of the province and well into Gaul. Here the amiticia is a tool for 
Caesar to try to manipulate Ariovistus into retiring from Gaul so that Caesar can 
take a larger role in the country. The institution is also used to bind useful Gauls 
to the Romans, and Caesar often relies on these Gauls to take action against their 
countrymen, such as his allies the Aedui. We can see, therefore, that amicitia is an 
institution which supports Roman imperialism, and in doing so strengthens the 
Borealism inherent to Rome’s relations with the Gauls (and Germans). It creates a 
framework in which Roman friendship is expected of “good” Gauls and that friend-
ship requires Gauls (and Germans) to act in Rome’s interests, even though Rome 
has no claim to Gaul beyond the province.
This leads into one of the driving ideas behind this text, which is the Gallic 
need for Roman rule. Above I mentioned that the Romans are the only ones able 
to keep the Germans on the east side of the Rhine. But there is more to the issue of 
a Roman “duty” in Gaul than just the threat of German invasion. Caesar shows us 
many Gallic tribes, like the Aedui, who want his help in the country. Gaul is divided 
between many different factions, and Caesar is the only agent in the region with 
enough power to overcome these divisions. This idea is introduced at 1.31.3: Galliae 
totius factiones esse duas. The idea of factiones recurs throughout Bellum Gallicum, at 
5.56 and at 6.11, 6.12, and 6.22. And even when the word is not mentioned, there is 
21  Said (1994, p. 2).
22  Marshall (1968, p. 40).
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still factionalism in Gaul. Those who cast in their lot with Vercingetorix and those 
who hold back are one example. The Aedui, ever Caesar’s friends (and friends of the 
Roman people, one may add), are the leaders of the pro-Caesar faction in book 7 
as before. Because no Gallic tribe is strong enough to dominate all the others (even 
Vercingetorix leads only with their consent, as we can see from the accusation of 
treason in 7.20.1), there would be no end to the fighting in Gaul without a powerful 
outside actor to intervene. Perhaps it could have been Ariovistus, but ultimately the 
Romans fill this power vacuum. Caesar presents a group of people who are doomed 
to constant war without his help, which legitimizes his interventions throughout 
Gaul as Bellum Gallicum progresses. This smooths over the fact that there is constant 
fighting during his adventures in Gaul, of course. Moreover, he uses the institution 
of amiticia to justify interventions to prevent factional violence against the amici 
Romani populi, even when the conflicts are far outside the province. This factional 
violence, and the division of Gaul into pro and anti-Roman factions, is part of how 
Caesar establishes Gaul as something for Rome to involve itself in, rather than a 
mysterious north. Moreover, the tendency towards factions and strife is one of the 
traits he uses to characterize the Gauls as one people, despite their diverse cultures 
and many states.
My last point about Romano-Gallic relations is about the idea of the pacifica-
tion of Gaul. Caesar is fond of declaring Gallia pacata before he departs to manage 
his province or deal with trouble in Rome. Omni Gallia pacata is found at 2.1, 2.34, 
3.26, and parte Galliae pacata at 6.5. Book 7 begins with quieta Gallia, as a nice change 
of pace. In Bellum Gallicum Caesar creates the idea that Gaul is one nation which 
he can pacify through military action. The people who live there would likely dis-
agree. On the one hand, they did not consider themselves as one nation, as Caesar 
acknowledges when he breaks Gaul into three parts of which only one is inhabited 
by Gauls (Celtae). And on the other hand, Gallia is never truly pacata in Bellum 
Gallicum. Long after Caesar’s death insurrections continued in Gaul, even though 
it was absorbed into the fledgling empire by that point. Not until well into the 1st 
century CE could it truly be claimed that omnia Gallia pacata.23 But Caesar’s nar-
rative demands a way for Roman readers to come to terms with his conquests. As 
Gaul becomes a more integral part of Roman material wealth and culture during the 
course of his proconsulate24, there is a need for a narrative that can explain Roman 
23  Drinkwater (2014, pp. 24-25): Managing Gaul and keeping the peace was a major project for Augustus 
and Tiberius, particularly after the failed attempt to conquer Germany under Augstus.
24  Said (1994, p. 10): The Orient is an integral material part of the Occident. Gaul similarly becomes an 
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relations with Gaul.25 Caesar creates a narrative, however divorced from reality it 
may be, that Gaul is quiet and safe for Roman trade and exploitation, which allows 
the Roman reader to come to terms with the idea of Gaul in the Roman world. 
After all, in quite a short time Gaul has changed from an open to a closed question. 
By this I mean that, before Caesar, further expansion of the province is still possible 
but not mandatory. Gaul is a frontier into which Rome could expand at its leisure, if 
the Romans so pleased. Caesar shifts the question from “if ” to “how” when he moves 
out of the province to subjugate all of what he calls Gaul. Establishing firm bound-
aries and narratives for Gaul is an important part of this process. Tacitus will later 
explore the still open (and never closed) German question in similar terms in his 
Germania.26 As Krebs points out, Caesar introduces the Germans as a third north-
ern people between the Gauls and the Scythians in Roman geography.27 An effect 
of this change in the narrative of northern Europe is that Gaul suddenly becomes 
manageable and domestic, and the foreignness and mystery of Gaul are transferred 
over the Rhine to Germany.28 Germany is the open question in Roman policy after 
Caesar omnia Gallia pacata.
Caesar shifts the narrative surrounding the Gauls over the course of Bellum 
Gallicum by inventing a clearly defined Gaul and identifying everyone who lives 
there as Gallic, whether or not they are Celtae. The identity he constructs for the 
Gauls as a divided, weak people in need of Roman rule is a departure from the 
traditional notion of Gauls as threatening warriors in the mysterious north. While 
Caesar does not deny the courage of the Gauls, he portrays them as so flawed in 
comparison to the Germans (who take up the mantle of frightening northern bar-
barians in Bellum Gallicum) and Romans that they cannot sustain independence. 
Even Vercingetorix, the best of the Gauls, is unable to unite the country (such as it 
integral part of Roman material culture due to Caesar’s campaigns as money, slaves, and trade draw Rome 
closer to Gaul.
25  As Osgood (2009, pp. 342-343) notes, the wealth flowing to Romans from Gaul was important not only 
to the officers accompanying Caesar, like Quintus Cicero, but also those back at Rome who borrowed against 
Caesar’s immense booty from the conquest.
26  Krebs (2010, pp. 203-205).
27  Krebs (2010, p. 203).
28  As an aside, Caesar also acclimates Romans to the idea of Britain, though he never managed to hold 
it. Caesar transformed Britain from a loose idea into an open question, one which he attempted to broach, 
albeit without success. Claudius responded to the open question of Britain, and Tacitus used it as a setting 
for his writing in the Agricola, but the question arises in Bellum Gallicum. Stewart (1995) explains the literary 
environment in which Caesar constructs his narrative about Britain.
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is) to defeat the Romans. Moreover, the lens through which Caesar sees the Gauls 
is one which allows him to justify and explain Gaul’s increased material importance 
in the Roman world. After all, Caesar’s adventures are about treasure and wealth, 
although he covers this up in Bellum Gallicum.29 The ideas of Gauls as divided, as 
dependent on Romans, and as having a flawed national character are all part of the 
Borealist narrative that explains why Romans are in Gaul and how they will contin-
ue to dominate the country. It is parallel to the Orientalist narrative constructed by 
the British in Egypt and elsewhere in the modern period. But the events of Caesar’s 
campaigns in Gaul show that this identity is one Caesar constructs rather than one 
founded on the truth. He is faced, on the one hand, with material circumstances in 
Gaul of persistent, tenacious resistance to Roman rule, and a country which is ac-
tually porous and divided. On the other hand, he has the ideological need to justify 
his own involvement in the country and Roman domination of Celtae, Belgae, and 
Aquitani (but not Britons or Germans). The synthesis of these competing ideas is an 
identity for Gauls and a definition for Gaul that smooths over the inconsistencies 
between the material circumstances and the ideological needs of the Roman con-
quest, and this is the identity we see presented in Bellum Gallicum.
29  Osgood (2009, p. 332).
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